

A Short History of the NIST RMF

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Brief History of NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)

• And then there was congress:

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 2002

NIST "shall ... [provide guidance for] minimum information security requirements ... no later than 36 months"

Brief Chronological History of the "RMF"



"RMF" – Inter-Relationship of NIST Guidance



RMF – NIST Controls, What they really are

<u>AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity</u> The organization:

Allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [_____].

<u>AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures</u> The information system:

a. Alerts [_____] in the event of an audit processing failure; and

b. Takes the following additional actions: [_____].

- NIST controls are purposefully *incomplete*
 - Blanks, multiple choice, and
 - NIST explicitly states may need to change text to "fully define the intent"

The controls are *template* text intended for use in expressing *derived* requirements

Reality Check – NIST Control Baselines

- **NOT** levels of security capability (even if you were told how to complete the purposefully incomplete NIST controls)
- Starting point alternative to a blank page
- "*starting point* in determining the security controls" to be <u>tailored</u>
 - scoped ("eliminate unnecessary"),
 - compensated ("alternatives"),
 - supplemented (add controls to *sufficiently mitigate risks to organizations, individuals, and the Nation*) and
 - Completed (blanks, multiple choice, and changes to control text)

Need - Capability engineering to achieve mission need (Not a set of controls)

From SP 800-160 (NIST's System Security Engineering (SSE) guidance

- 1. "... *security objectives* are foundational in that they establish and scope what it means to be adequately secure"
- 2. "Protection needs are determined based on the security objectives, life cycle concepts, and stakeholder concerns [and] subsequently transformed into <u>stakeholder security requirements</u>"
- 3. "... transforms the stakeholder security requirements into the <u>system</u> <u>requirements</u> that reflect a technical security view of the system"
- 4. "... generate system <u>architecture</u> alternatives, to select one or more alternative(s) that frame stakeholder concerns and meet system requirements, and to express this in a set of consistent views."

Bottom line - Engineering required

"... today's systems have dimensions and an inherent complexity that **require a disciplined and structured engineering approach** to achieve any expectation that the inherent complexity can be effectively managed"

Quotes from SP 800-160 [emphasis added]

Engineering: Expertise and experience to capture complex system requirements without expectation of pre-defined, answers-in-policy